SIDC OPSCOM Report on Critical Incident Experienced on 24th January 2025

02.06.2025

1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders on the global critical incident that happened on 24th January at SIDC resulting in an EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market downtime of 10 minutes, which impacted the Single Intra-Day Coupling (SIDC) trading in Europe. Manual halt by one of the NEMO Central Admin parties caused a 10-minute downtime in XBID cross-border continuous trading. The issue was resolved by the NEMO Central Admin on-duty, by setting the market back to trading, and normal operations resumed.

2. Introduction

This report serves to fulfil the obligation under CACM on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

This report is structured as follows. In Chapter 3, SIDC is described. In Chapter 4, the normal operational process, as covered in the operational procedures with respective timings, is described. In Chapter 5, the incident management process applied when critical incidents occur is described. In Chapter 6, a description of the incident, including inter alia the timing and the root cause, are provided. Finally, in Chapter 7, the mitigation measures to resolve the issue and the lessons learnt are presented.

3. Single Intraday Coupling

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the energy is needed.

An integrated intraday market makes intraday trading more efficient across Europe by:

- promoting competition
- increasing liquidity
- making it easier to share energy generation resources
- making it easier for market participants to allow for unexpected changes in consumption and outages

As renewable intermittent production such as solar energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the day-ahead market.

Being able to balance their positions until one hour before delivery time is beneficial for market

participants and for the power systems alike by, among other things, reducing the need for reserves and associated costs while allowing enough time for carrying out system operation processes for ensuring system security.

The first go-live wave was in June 2018 and included 15 countries. A second go-live with seven further countries was achieved in November 2019. A third go-live including Italy in September 2021 took place, and the latest go-live, the fourth wave, added Slovakia and Greece in November 2022. The picture below depicts all current countries in SIDC.



See for more information the following websites:

- ENTSO-E
- NEMO Committee

4. Normal Operational Process

This section depicts the normal operational process where incidents are resolved following incident management process (as described in Chapter 4).

The normal operational process is described in the timeline below:



5. Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID or a disturbance of the communication channels connecting these systems. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (local) backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline (e.g. gate closure or gate opening) of the Single Intraday Coupling.

The operational parties agreed to follow the incident management procedure to handle incidents. The incident management procedure assumes that communication to relevant 3rd parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participant, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the incident management procedure describes the handling of incidents, which includes the operation of the Incident Committee and the fallback solution to be applied following the procedures, e.g. closing and re-opening of Interconnectors, closing and restarting of market area(s), delivery area(s) or trading service.

The Incident Committee is only to be triggered for the management of a critical or major incident of the XBID system, critical or major incident of a Transit Shipping Agent System and Shipping Agent default. Any other incident can only trigger the Incident Committee when the incident fulfils the pre-defined criteria. In order to prevent the Incident Committee call to be triggered for incorrect reasons, the parties perform an initial internal check and a cross check with other

parties on the incident before raising the incident as a central issue.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Coupling processes, an Incident Committee needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC.

Participants to the Incident Committee identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee, and the decision taking place during the Incident Committee call.

At the start of the Incident Committee the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident - where needed - on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee the parties also decide on communication to the market participants deemed necessary.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee the IC SPOC will create/finalize the IC report and make the IC report available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the IC report.

6. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders on global critical incident at SIDC that happened on 24th January resulting in EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market downtime of 10 minutes, which impacted Single Intra-Day Coupling (SIDC) trading in Europe. Manual halt by one of the NEMO Central Admin parties caused a 10-minute downtime in XBID cross-border continuous trading. The issue was resolved by NEMO Central Admin on-duty, by setting the market to trading, and normal operations resumed.

6.1 Timeline

NEMO Central Admin, following the detection of the critical incident by TTN, initiated the Incident Committee Conference Call (“ICCC”).

System failure	2025/01/24 10:56
Triggering of IC	2025/01/24 10:50
System recovered	2025/01/24 11:06
Green light from supplier	-

Green light from all parties to start trading	2025/01/24 11:04
Restart of trading	2025/01/24 11:06

6.2 Course of Event

On January 24th, 2025, at 10:50 CET, an Incident Call was triggered.

10:54 CET: NEMO Central Admin started the Call and shared the screen with the incident report.

10:55 CET: The NEMO who initiated the call declared the reason for raising the Incident Call which was a wrong trading schedule for the recently introduced 15-Minute Market Time Unit (MTU) resolution for a Delivery Area. Finding a resolution to the issue was ongoing - by all the market coupling parties and by all the system providers - but it had not been finalized by this time.

10:58 CET: Several parties during the Incident Call reported that XBID market had been set on halt. Parties had been reported that the halt was performed by a NEMO Central Admin user. This was followed by a cross-check action by the NEMO Central Admin on-duty.

11:04 CET: Parties had agreed that the market could be reopened.

11:06 CET: NEMO Central Admin on-duty manually reopened the market.

11:08 CET: While the previous actions were performed, the XBID Service Provider had joined the incident call, and they confirmed no service interruption from their/ the application side. Following this, an investigation was initiated by them.

11:27 CET: XBID Service Provider confirmed that the market halt had been initiated manually.

Standard operations were restored at 11:06 CET.

6.3 Root Cause

The incident was triggered by manual halt of the market from the Shared Order Book User Interface (SOB UI). The user that halted the market is NEMO Central Admin user.

Service Provider established the following:

- XBID was up and running - there was no error or bug that triggered the incident.
- A cyberattack from external parties has been excluded.
- Logfiles proved that the market was halted by a manual human interaction.

Service Provider has identified an IP address where the actions were initiated, and parties followed up from that point to perform a "lessons learnt" following this incident. They also

ensured that central preventive measures are taken to prevent such incidents from happening again in the future.

6.4 Impact

Downtime	10 minutes
Critical business process impacted	XBID trading
Procedural impact	N/A

7. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure a successful restoration of the operations, the following measures were taken:

Supplier's Short-Term Solution	Investigation from Service Provider ensured that XBID works as intended and no cyberattack caused the incident.
Supplier's Long-Term Measures	-
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	Dedicated Working Groups (which already existed) started investigating the options to prevent similar occurrences in the future. They looked into details to check if certain procedural actions need to be updated. Updates in procedures guarantee increased traceability of the activities of NEMO Central Admin parties. Also potential enrichment of the logs to be discussed to identify actions in more details.